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Dr. Wm. Barnaby Faherty, S.J. 
Senior Historian Apollo Project 
University of Florida 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32788
ABSTRACT
Writing the history of Apollo so close to the 
conclusion of the program has advantages and dis­ 
advantages. The advantages lie in the opportun­ 
ities for interviews with the participants in this 
tremendous enterprise, the availability of multi­ 
tudinous documentation, and the opportunity of 
weighing interview with documentation. The 
disadvantages are those of all contemporary 
history: the lack of perspective that only time 
can give; the inability to see ultimate results; 
and the necessity of causing hurt to some individ­ 
uals. Even if the passage of time will force a 
change of some analysis, still the assembling of 
the story at this time will preserve factual 
materials for historians of future generations. 
But some aspects of the program will never undergo 
reevaluation--especially the tremendous cooperative 
effort of government, industry, military and 
university in sending men to the moon and bringing 
them back safely.
BODY
Amid the 7,000 acronyms and abbreviations in the 
selective list put out by the John F. Kennedy Space 
Center, none of you will find GROTSOB. Yet a few 
years ago the pad men on the Cape used this 
regularly. It meant simply "get rid of the SOB."
While reading through an off-the-record interview 
an earlier historian had taken with a particular 
individual on the pad, I found that one spoke of 
the almost incredible shock he faced in dealing 
for the first time with a particular astronaut. 
The man's language was so grotesque, his reaction 
so out of control, that this expert ground crew 
man with years of experience at White Sands Proving 
Ground behind him couldn't sleep that night. The 
next day he replayed the tape to see if he had been 
imagining things. He had not. His comment in this 
interview was: "I certainly hope that they burned 
that tape." The pad man was speaking about one of 
the great heroes of the nation.
I asked another man who had worked on the pad if 
they had difficulties with any of the astronauts. 
He spoke highly of certain individuals and partic­ 
ular teams. He stressed the fact that astronauts
like all human beings had their various human 
characteristics: some were democratic and easy of 
access, some a little bit more aristocratic or of 
old line military bearing, some professorial, some 
scientific. He concluded: "But one of them was 
an SOB. In fact," the pad man stated, "that 
astronaut provoked a new term that we used on the 
pad: GROTSOB." It was the same astronaut that 
the first pad man had denounced.
What did the other astronauts think of him? One 
heard about the conduct of his fellow astronaut 
and called together the entire ground crew to 
apologize; then he came back at 12:05 AM to apolo­ 
gize to the night crew. Another of the astronauts, 
a crew: man of the one in question, said to a pad 
man: "Just think: I have to spend two weeks in 
space with that SOB!"
I do not intend to take away from the honor and 
bravery of this man--I will never mention his 
name--nor cast aspersions on any of this tremendous 
group of men who went off into space. Fortunately, 
the evaluation of specific flights and astronauts 
lies in the province of other NASA historians. 
We're writing on the launch facilities and opera­ 
tions at Kennedy Space Center.
I mention the story of GROTSOB because it points 
up two important considerations in writing the 
history of Apollo: first, we historian-writers 
have to translate the involved jargon of the space 
industry into the language of the American tax­ 
payer; secondly, we have to deal with contempor­ 
aries, men who succeeded and men who failed; men 
who combine brilliance and pettiness; and some of 
these men are looking over our shoulders as we 
write.
Before I proceed farther, let me answer a question 
many ask, and one that might come to your mind: 
what is a clergyman doing writing the history of 
Apollo? Let me state clearly that it was not as a 
priest, but as an historian that the University of 
Florida invited me, a Professor of History at Saint 
Louis University, to participate in writing the 
History of Apollo, in particular the launch opera­ 
tions and facilities at the Kennedy Space Center. 
It was not because Canon Copernicus was a priest 
but because he was a scientist that we remember 
that he told his 16th Century contemporaries that
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the earth revolved around the sun. Not as a priest, 
but as a priest-astronomer, my fellow Jesuit 
Giovanni Riccioli gave the names of the "Sea of 
Tranquility" and "Sea of Storms" to various 
sections of the moon in the year 1651. Other areas, 
incidentally, he named after prominent Jesuits of 
the time. I'm sure he named one after his superior 
so that the reverend gentleman would not put him 
into some remote Italian parish when he wanted to 
continue his astronomical studies. "Crater Hell" 
took its name not from the infernal region but from 
a German priest-astronomer Father Maximillian Hell.
In short, over the centuries priests have engaged 
in the advance of knowledge in a variety of fields 
well beyond the basic religious areas. Modern 
scientists should not forget that even though the 
Commission of Cardinals repudiated the theory of 
Galileo, it was still the Pope, and not any one of 
the secular rulers of Europe, who patronized and 
financed Galileo's studies even after the condemna­ 
tion of his theory. Galileo, further, did not 
convince his contemporary scientists any more than 
he did the theologians and scripture buffs-­ 
Protestant or Catholic.
In our history, my colleague and I frequently 
discuss the introduction of a distinct layer of 
operatives to handle a situation NASA could presum­ 
ably have handled itself with its own talented 
manpower. Why then did the Kennedy Space Center 
contract with the University of Florida to handle 
this history? Up to a point the local team of 
historians that has been at the Kennedy Space 
Center for years could do a far better job than we. 
But they would face four great problems: as 
members of the Space Center team they have long 
since lost contact with the layman's viewpoint and 
would most likely tend to write an in-house history 
for people in the house; they would not enjoy the 
freedom of action that outsiders can command; 
removed as they have been from the mainstream of 
American historical development, they would tend 
to write of Apollo in a vacuum, as if it did not 
occur during the days of the burning cities, the 
campus riots, the most umpopular war in America's 
history; and lastly and of the greatest importance, 
the scholarly world beyond the space community 
would hardly accept it as an objective study but 
presume it to be NASA self-promotion.
The qualifications that NASA put down for the 
senior historian, that he be not just an historian 
but a writer who had published before, adds great 
validity, as it did when NASA asked the team of 
Constance McLaughlin Green, a Pulitzer prize 
winner, and Milton Lomask, a teacher of creative 
writing at the Georgetown Writers' Conference, to 
undertake the Vanguard history. A writer visua­ 
lizes his readers. He enters into their minds and 
their hearts with a sympathetic understanding. In 
other words, he comes to realize what they already 
know and what they want to learn.
But why should we write the history now, rather 
than let time put the facts in perspective? We can 
see current evaluations of presidents like Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman that differ
greatly from the opinions men held when each left 
office. In another 50 years the view will modify 
even more. So will it be with the story of Apollo.
But at the same time certain views only contem­ 
poraries can give. If we do not get the story from 
the immediate reflections and the written memos of 
these contemporaries, that may well disappear over 
the years, can we see the story as it appeared at 
the time? This is a most valuable exercise. So 
often we have faced history from hindsight. We're 
all great Monday-morning quarterbacks. The story 
at Yalta is a prime example of that. We forget 
what information our American officials had when 
they went to Yalta. We forget that the Conference 
took place only seven weeks after the near disaster 
of the Bulge; that our scientists had not yet 
succeeded with the atomic bomb; that our military 
leaders wanted Russia in the war with Japan; that
Russia had borne the brunt of war and had been 
successful in two long steady years of advance from 
the day of Stalingrad to that time. We forget, in 
short, what men at Kennedy Space Center call "the 
state of the art": the facts as men knew them at 
the time of major decisions.
The letters of the Civil War soldiers to their 
folks at home, for instance, differ remarkably from 
the reminiscences of these same men when years 
later they looked back upon the only exciting 
experiences of their lives. Yet the first picture 
was the true one, not these memories that grew more 
interesting as the years went on.
The contemporary historian, further, serves a great 
purpose to future historians in that from the 
surfeit of documentation he selects what he judges 
is of value--what men should retain, what they may 
well discard. He divides his time between inter­ 
view and documentation and he soon finds out that, 
no matter what the man's reputation for memory is, 
in one or other instance, his memory will fail. 
Two men with a reputation for extremely acute 
memories have given us information that simply was 
not correct — but only in matters of time sequence 
in both instances. These men anticipated the date 
of decision or the date of an agreement.
The other problem that an historian of contemporary 
affairs faces is the telling of events that might 
offend individuals. We may hurt some people in our 
book; but we will not hurt them for the sake of 
hurting them. If the event or personal quality 
does not really pertain to the essence of the 
story, like the name of the obnoxious astronaut, we 
will omit it. But if it pertains to the essence of 
the story and this truth hurts, then we and the one 
hurt will have to live with it. That is the only 
way that history can serve future generations. We 
have to balance interview against interview, and 
interview against document, and document against 
document.
Rare is the man who admits that he did not see the 
issue as it would turn out.. Rare is the man who is 
not the hero, in some small way at least, of the 
entire operation. I can recall the book review by 
an American Air Force General, of the memoirs of
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the most prominent English General in World War II.
 
This English General had said that he was to advanc
e 
to a certain point in Normandy and dig in. The 
American Air Officer distinctly remembered that the
 
High Command had ordered the British General to 
close the gap. To be sure of his facts, the 
American General got out the documentation of the 
staff meeting, and found a clear order that the 
British Officer was to close the Falaise Gap and 
cut off the escape route of the German Seventh Army
. 
The Seventh Army escaped. The British General 
never admitted that he had failed. But what can we
 
'expect of a man who said on American TV that Robert
 
E, Lee lacked courage?
If we write a history book that everyone likes, it 
will not be good history, because not everyone 
succeeded in every endeavor he set out to do any 
more than that British General did; not every man 
had the most brilliant idea but reluctantly went on
 
with it when somebody below him pushed for that 
idea. Or more likely it was the reverse: maybe th
e 
top man said: "Do it or else"; and in order to 
retain his job the man went along with a program 
that he disapproved.
From our studies of Apollo so far, what do we see? 
We see obviously what can be accomplished when men 
set a goal for themselves and put a time limit on 
that goal. We can accomplish tremendous things. 
At the time of Yuri Gagahan's flight, President 
Kennedy said: "By concentrating all its effort on 
one single goal any totalitarian power can achieve 
that goal." The President wanted a corresponding 
effort. He would have preferred something equally 
dramatic but of much greater practical value to the
 
world at the time, like desalting the ocean. Those
 
were his own words according to his scientific 
advisor. The moonshot was the most likely alter­ 
native. President Kennedy gave us a challenge to 
show what we as a nation could do.
The decision of the President to do everything out 
in the open with the entire nation watching on TV 
put a tremendous pressure on the men of NASA and 
their contractors; but it called forth from them an
 
extra effort necessary to avoid the embarrassment 
of public failure. Three American astronauts died 
on a training session in a spacecraft; the American
 
public knew about it that very evening. Three 
Russian astronauts died returning from outer space.
 
We do not yet know if they were the three who manne
d 
the Russian Sky-Lab; though the presumption of a 
Russian space film seemed to suggest that.
In calling for the moonshot, President Kennedy chos
e 
the race course and named our entry. Some skeptics
 
predicted that we would reach the moon and find the
 
Soviet flag there. We reached the moon--but found 
no red flag.
Apollo drew upon a far wider spectrum of talents 
than any other peacetime effort in history. It 
gradually broke down the petty jealousies, the 
inter-service rivalries, the previous priorities, 
the friction between firms, and sometimes within 
branches of the same firm. It climaxed an existing
NASA effort to bring together various military and 
civilian teams, such as the Army Ballistic Missile 
Team under General Medearis and Dr. von Braun; and 
the Navy's Vanguard team that sent up, within its 
specified time, one of the most intricately instru­
 
mented satellites—men estimate it will be in orbit
 
for two centuries; Caltech's Jet Propulsion Labora­
 
tory; Langley's Space Task Group; a host of newly 
organized industrial teams; and a wide variety of 
civilian and military leaders, such as Albert 
Siepert, James Webb, Brainerd Holmes, George
Mueller, Lt. General Samuel Phillips, and Rear 
Admiral Roderick Middleton.
At the same time Apollo demonstrated what happens 
when we let a means become a goal. The moon 
landing became not the first of our ventures in 
space but the culmination. When we got to the moon
 
we had won the race. And we are suffering for that
 
now. It was a public relations flap — to use the 
space jargon—that, try as they would, NASA's 
public relations experts could not forestall.
And so part of our historical effort must be to 
put our space program back on the main flight 
pattern. To do this we need only tell the full, 
magnificent story of Apollo and the entire space 
program as it occurred. It needs no apology nor 
false promotion.
"The real importance of the Apollo program," 
Congressman Joseph E. Karth of Minnesota stated in 
an address before the National Space Club over a 
year before Armstrong and Aldrin landed, "is not 
just the physical act of getting to the moon. 
Rather, the significance lies in developing the 
technology to do it. The accompanying advances in 
our economy, in production of new products, in new 
factories and new jobs — these are what really 
matter. Money for space is spent on earth, not in 
space. The flow of these funds into the economy, 
and the benefit of increasing knowledge will return
 
many fold the cost to the taxpayers today."^ '
In an adjacent vein, Associate Editor Tom Alexander
 
wrote in the July 1969 issue of FORTUNE magazine: 
"The really significant fallout from the strains, 
traumas, and endless experimentation of Project 
Apollo has been of a sociological rather than a 
technological nature; techniques for directing the 
massed endeavors of scores of thousands of minds in
 
a closeknit, mutually enhancive combination of 
government, university and private industry. This 
is potentially the most powerful tool in man's
history." (2) Haynes Johnson wrote shortly af
ter in
THE WASHINGTON POST: "Some intimately associated 
with America's space effort see its greatest 
achievement as a state of mind .... The space 
program is the cleared proof that a nation can set 
a difficult goal and carry it out. If it has done 
nothing else, it has demonstrated how America can, 
when it wants to, marshall its talent, commit its 
treasure, gain public support and achieve its 
task." (3 *
We must remind people of the constant gains from 
space technology. To select a few, we can point to
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their enjoyment of winter games at Sapporo, Japan, 
and of the golf tournaments in Hawaii on TV through 
the use of space satellites; the transoceanic phone 
communications through the International Telecommu­ 
nications Satellite Consortium; the weather fore­ 
casting that, for instance, kept track of Camille 
and sent out warnings that saved countless lives, 
even though the force of the hurricane was as 
destructive as the one that killed 5,000 near 
Galveston back at the turn of the century; the use 
of titanium alloys in oil refineries; the electro­ 
magnetic hammer, developed for use on the Saturn V 
at Marshall and now interesting aircraft, ship and 
automobile manufacturers; the "o-ring shock 
absorber," developed by NASA, and now employed by 
many states in their highway barrier system; the 
transmission of electro-cardiograms by radio and 
telephone from the scene of accidents to hospitals, 
to mention just one medical help from space 
research; the marshalling of management techniques 
to insure an orderly flow of components; a motorized 
wheel chair, activated by a sight switch that will 
give more than 100,000 paraplegics greater mobil­ 
ity—the result of a device to permit astronauts to 
operate space controls when strong gravitational 
forces prevented movement of their arms; the Kansas 
City Airport Control Room on the 8th floor of the 
downtown City Hall that resembles the Launch 
Control Center at Kennedy; and fabrics for clothes 
and blankets that are light in weight and highly 
insulated. The Earth Resources Technological 
Satellite (and the Sky-Lab) will provide informa­ 
tion on crop growth, the use of grazing lands, the 
ecological effects of the meandering of the Gulf 
Stream off the east coast of the U. S.; the 
formation and location of icebergs; the precise 
area where herring are feeding at a given time; the 
location of major ore deposits; storm and tidal 
erosion on our coasts; the inventory of timber 
resources; the extent of snow cover in the high 
sierras; pollution of lakes; infestation of crops; 
land use in the clustered cities of the country. 
The vast extent of uses of space-gained knowledge 
dazzles the imagination. We must let it out to the 
general public in understandable but decidedly 
steady driblets ... coming ... coming ...
Further, we must be frank. I would advise a frank 
statement by NASA, the American scientific commu­ 
nity and the people in the space industry of what 
we would like to do in the next 25 years, or rather 
37 years. Where would we like to be by the year 
2000? State it clearly to the American people. 
State it in a blood, sweat, toil, and tears atmos­ 
phere. Tell clearly what it would mean and how 
much it would cost, not simply in round numbers, 
but in dramatic contrast to the huge amount of 
money we spend on pets--as much as we spent annually 
on space ventures—on alcohol, automobiles, or air­ 
craft carriers.
To the constantly repeated complaint that effort in 
space works against efforts on earth, I suggest a 
frontal attack in either one of two ways. Dr. 
Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, hit it head-on: "Space exploration," 
he insisted in a public statement of July 24, 1970, 
"rather than being in opposition to meeting needs
on Earth, is in fact part of the search for know­ 
ledge that is indispensable for meeting those 
needs . . .."^^ Congressman Olin E. Teague, a 
tiger in his support of space activities, remarked 
in the House of Representatives in May 1968, "Some 
people ask, 'Why should we spend this money to 
explore space when there is so much to be done here 
on earth? 1 Well, there was plenty to be done in 
Europe when Columbus left it. And there is still 
plenty to be done there. If Columbus had waited 
until Europe had no more internal problems, he would 
still be waiting, but the opening up of the new 
world did more to revive the European culture and 
economy than any internal actions could possible 
have done."(5)
While I like the idea of a civilian agency like 
NASA and the idea that it was a civilian who first 
stepped on the moon, at the same time I think it 
highly imperative that we give to our military 
people some chance to achievement other than in 
war. I would rather have a future General George 
Patton land on Mars than in Moscow.
These then are some of the issues that I would like 
to present to you today. There is too much defeat­ 
ism in the entire space industry. We need firmness 
of purpose. We need clear cut decisions. We need 
frankness in dealing with the American people and 
the people of the world, telling them what we have 
accomplished and what we would like to accomplish. 
We need to pursue international cooperation. One 
of the men who is speaking in this Consortium 
represents a Franco-German combination in a space 
venture. Recall that 30 years ago Frenchmen and 
Germans thought they had to hate each other forever. 
Ever since the Communistic Revolution of 1917 we 
have been justly suspicious of Soviet Russia. We 
admire the tremendous sacrifice the little people 
of Russia made to repel Hitler's invasion. But we 
also recognize the Cold War, the rape of Hungary, 
the Berlin Wall, the Cuban missile crisis — the last 
two events that occurred since we began our moon 
program. We can't scrap our defense; but likewise 
we can't go on living forever with rockets pointed 
at Moscow and Leningrad. We welcome the cooper­ 
ation in space that will be represented by the 
joint effort of Soyuz and our spacecraft. We must 
work together to enrich this fragile planet. We 
must go off beyond the moon to other areas.
When I first expressed the idea that perhaps it was 
the destiny of our's and the next generation to 
bring the message of the Sermon on the Mount to 
intelligent beings on other planets, as Columbus 
brought this message to the people of the new 
world, I thought it was an original idea. But I 
read since that Werhner von Braun had said the same 
thing some years before. This may well be our 
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